



## Problem 4. «Weaknesses of the PHIGFS»

A young cryptographer Philip designs a family of lightweight block ciphers based on a 4-line type-2 Generalized Feistel scheme (GFS) with better diffusion effect.

Its block is divided into four  $m$ -bit subblocks,  $m \geq 1$ . For better diffusion effect, Philip decides to use a  $(4 \times 4)$ -matrix  $A$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$  instead of a standard subblocks shift register in each round. The family  $\text{PHIGFS}_\ell(A, b)$  is parameterized by a non-linear permutation  $b: \mathbb{F}_{2^m} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ , the matrix  $A$  and the number of rounds  $\ell \geq 1$ . The one-round keyed transformation of  $\text{PHIGFS}_\ell(A, b)$  is a permutation  $g_k$  on  $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}^4$  defined as:

$$g_k(x_3, x_2, x_1, x_0) = A \cdot (x_3, x_2 \oplus b(x_3 \oplus k_1), x_1, x_0 \oplus b(x_1 \oplus k_0))^T,$$

where  $x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3 \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ ,  $k = (k_1, k_0)$  is a  $2m$ -bit round key,  $k_0, k_1 \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ .

The  $\ell$ -round encryption function  $f_{k^{(1)}, \dots, k^{(\ell)}}: \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^4 \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^4$  under a key  $(k^{(1)}, \dots, k^{(\ell)}) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^\ell$  is given by

$$f_{k^{(1)}, \dots, k^{(\ell)}}(\mathbf{x}) = g_{k^{(\ell)}} \dots g_{k^{(1)}}(\mathbf{x}) \text{ for all } \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^4.$$

For effective implementation and security, Philip chooses two binary matrices  $A', A''$  with the maximum branch number among all binary matrices of size 4, where

$$A' = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad A'' = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

For approval, he shows the cipher to his friend Antony who claims that  $A', A''$  are bad choices because ciphers  $\text{PHIGFS}_\ell(A', b)$ ,  $\text{PHIGFS}_\ell(A'', b)$  are insecure against distinguisher attacks for all  $b: \mathbb{F}_{2^m} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ ,  $\ell \geq 1$ .

Help Philip to analyze the cipher  $\text{PHIGFS}_\ell(A, b)$ . Namely, for any  $b: \mathbb{F}_{2^m} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$  and any  $\ell \geq 1$ , show that  $\text{PHIGFS}_\ell(A, b)$  has

- (a)  $\ell$ -round differential sets with probability 1;
- (b)  $\ell$ -round impossible differential sets;

for the following cases: **Q1**  $A = A'$ ; and **Q2**  $A = A''$ . In each case, construct these nontrivial differential sets and prove the corresponding property.

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**Remark.** Let us recall the following definitions.

- Let  $\delta, \varepsilon \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  be fixed nonzero input and output differences. The *differential probability* of  $s: \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  is defined as

$$p_{\delta, \varepsilon}(s) = 2^{-n} \cdot |\{\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \mid s(\alpha \oplus \delta) \oplus s(\alpha) = \varepsilon\}|.$$

- If  $s: \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \times K \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  depends on a key space  $K$ , then the *differential probability* of  $s$  is defined as

$$p_{\delta, \varepsilon}(s) = |K|^{-1} \sum_{k \in K} p_{\delta, \varepsilon}(s_k),$$

where  $s(x, k) = s_k(x)$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ ,  $k \in K$ .

- Let  $\Omega, \Delta \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \setminus \{0\}$  and  $\Omega, \Delta$  are nonempty. If  $p_{\delta, \varepsilon}(s) = 0$  for any  $\delta \in \Omega$ ,  $\varepsilon \in \Delta$ , then  $(\Omega, \Delta)$  are *impossible differential sets*. But if

$$\sum_{\delta \in \Omega, \varepsilon \in \Delta} p_{\delta, \varepsilon}(s) = 1,$$

then  $(\Omega, \Delta)$  are *differential sets with probability 1*. We call  $(\Omega, \Delta)$  trivial (impossible) differential sets if  $\Omega \in \{\emptyset, \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \setminus \{0\}\}$  or  $\Delta \in \{\emptyset, \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \setminus \{0\}\}$ .